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Abstract—Wireless sensor networks are often deployed in open
and uncontrolled environments that make them more vulnerable
to security attacks. Cryptographic algorithms can be used to
protect the data collected by the sensors against an intruder.
The cost in terms of energy to provide enough security can
be quite large as these algorithms may be very complex. As
communication is the main energy consumer, a way to save energy
is to use data compression. We propose to measure the impact
of the well-known DES algorithm on the energy consumption for
various number of rounds and then, we show that energy-free
security may be possible. We combine a cryptographic algorithm
with a compression algorithm and show through a model that
a node can provide security without consuming more energy.
The only counterpart is the time for ciphering and compressing.
We get some results from experiments on energy consumption
of cryptographic and compression algorithms and establish the
level of security that can be achieved in various cases, from a
single node to a random network.
Keywords–Wireless sensor networks; security; compression; en-
ergy
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a specific ad-hoc
network with a large number of nodes that have limited
energy. These networks are used for collecting information
about natural phenomena and other applications. As they are
generally deployed in open and uncontrolled environments,
wireless sensor networks are more vulnerable to security
attacks [1][2][3][4].
Many cryptographic protocols have been proposed to deal
with security issues [2][5][6]. They rely on cryptographic
primitives like public key cryptographic algorithms or secret
key cryptographic algorithms or cryptographic hash functions.
The impact on energy consumption of some of these primitives
has already been evaluated [7].
As communication is the main energy consumer, a way
to save energy in wireless sensor network is to use data
compression [8]. Again, the impact on energy consumption
of compression algorithms has been evaluated [9][10][11].
In this paper, we first propose to measure the impact of the
well-known Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm on the
energy consumption of a MSP430-based node. Then, our main
contribution is to show that energy-free security is possible.
We combine a cryptographic algorithm with a compression
algorithm and show through a model that a node can provide
security without consuming more energy. The only counterpart
is the time for ciphering and compressing involving CPU
cycles, which is largely less consuming than communication.
In section II, we analyze the related work regarding security
and compression algorithms in wireless sensor networks. Then,
in section III, we provide experimental results for DES on a
MSP430 based node from the Senslab plaform. In section IV,
we give an energy consumption model for cryptographic
algorithms and compression algorithms and in section V, we
show that it may be possible to have energy-free security.
In section VI, we use a linear network to achieve better
security considering the energy of the whole network. Finally,
in section VII, we show that, even on random networks,
it is possible to have strong energy-free security with high
probability.
II. RELATED WORK
Regarding security in general, there are two main families
of cryptographic algorithms: public key cryptographic algo-
rithms like RSA or ElGamal and secret key cryptographic
algorithms like DES or Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
The advantages of public key cryptography is the availability
of authentication and key exchange mechanisms. Public key
cryptography is secure and reliable as it is based on strong
mathematical theorems. Meanwhile it needs complex arith-
metical and logical operations. Strong public key cryptography
can affect the lifetime of a node [12][4].
The other solution is to use secret key cryptography.
Secret key cryptography relies on simple operations like bit
shifting and basic bitwise logical operations (or, and, xor)
that can easily be adapted to sensor nodes. Lee et al [7]
considered some well-known cryptographic algorithms (AES,
RC5, Skipjack, XXTEA) and studied the influence of some
parameters (number of rounds, size of the key) on the energy
consumption of MicaZ and TelosB sensor nodes. In particular,
they show that the energy consumption of RC5 encryption
increases linearly with the number of rounds.
In a wireless sensor node, communication is the main
energy consumer. An idea to save energy is to apply a com-
pression algorithm before sending data so that the energy used
for compression is counterbalanced by the energy saved for
communication [8][11]. Capo et al. [9] used a MSP430-based
node and measured the consumption of different compression
algorithms: S-LZW, Run-Length Encoding (RLE) and K-RLE.
III. EXPERIMENTS WITH DES ON MSP430
A. Data Encryption Standard (DES)
DES is a symmetric key cryptographic algorithm that was
standardized in 1977 and has been used widely since then.
DES is based on a Feistel scheme with a 56-bit key and 16
TABLE I. ENERGY CONSUMPTION OF DES WITH VARIOUS NUMBER
OF ROUNDS
Rounds 2 4 8 16
Energy (µJ) 21.48 24.75 30.27 40.55
rounds. Each round consists in a fixed set of four operations
called Expansion, Key mixing, Substitution and Permutation
that operates on 64-bit blocks that are divided in two 32-
bit half-blocks [13]. In our experiments, we use a custom
implementation of DES in C that can be tuned to reduce the
number of rounds.
B. The Senslab testbed
The Senslab platform [14] is an experimental platform
for wireless sensor networks. Its aim is to automate the
deployment, test, and monitoring of wireless sensor network
applications. Each of the four sites of the platform has 256
MSP430-based nodes that can be used to make tests. Each
node can be monitored with several probes. The frequency of
the measures can be chosen for each experiment. At the end
of the experiment, the measures are stored in a simple file for
each node.
In our experiment, we used the Senslab platform and
we measured the power consumption of a node that was
compressing some data with the DES algorithm. The frequency
of the measures was set to 100ms.
C. Experiment description
The experiment consists in measuring the power consumed
by the DES algorithm on a MSP430-based node of the Senslab
platform. For each experiment, we used random input data of
λ = 64 bits. The number of rounds ranges over the values 2,
4, 8 and 16. Each experiment is repeated five times and the
average value is given.
D. Results
Table I shows the results obtained in the previous experi-
ment with various number of rounds.
Figure 1 shows the same results on a plot. We observe that
the relation between energy consumption and the number of
rounds is linear, of the form: E = E0+ r×Er where r is the
number of rounds. E0 is a constant that represents the energy
for constant operations in the algorithm, i.e., operations that do
not depend on the number of rounds : initial and final permu-
tation, permuted choice 1 (PC1) in the key schedule. Er is the
energy per round. Applying a linear regression on the data of
table I, we find E0 = 19.149µJ and Er = 1.348µJ/round. The
estimation of this linear regression is also shown on figure 1.
As a conclusion of this experiment, we found a linear
relationship between energy consumption and the number of
rounds for DES. It is of the same kind as the one found in
[7] for RC5. These uncorrelated results can lead to a general
model for encryption with symmetric cryptographic algorithm.
This model is described in the next section.
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Figure 1. Energy consumption of DES with various number of rounds
TABLE II. VALUES OF EENC0 AND E
ENC
r FOR VARIOUS ENCRYPTION
ALGORITHMS
Algorithm Eenc0 (nJ/bit) E
enc
r (nJ/round/bit)
DES 299.2 21.06
RC5 [7] 336.4 173.28
IV. MODELING COMPRESSION AND ENCRYPTION IN WSN
A. Modeling encryption
As seen before, we can model the energy consumption of
encryption as:
Eenc(λ, r) = λ× (Eenc0 + r × Eencr ) (1)
In addition to the previous experiment, we introduce λ,
the length of the input data, in our model. There should be
another constant factor that does not depend on the length of
the input data, but we assume this constant factor is negligible.
For example, in DES, the only operation that does not depend
on the number of rounds and the length of the input data is
PC1, which is a very simple operation compared to the rest of
the algorithm.
Table II shows the values of Eenc0 and E
enc
r for various al-
gorithms. The DES values are computed from our experiment.
The RC5 values are computed from figure 3 in [7]. We took
the values of the TelosB node as it is a MSP430-based node,
and we summed the ”setup” phase and ”encryption” phase to
have the full algorithm. We assumed the length of data to be
λ = 8 bytes = 64 bits, by comparing this figure with figure 5
in [7] and taking into account that the word size was divided
by two (16 versus 32 respectively).
Figure 2 shows the energy consumption of RC5 that was
computed from [7] and the estimation that we did for this
algorithm.
RC5 and DES have a similar constant term Eenc0 whereas
the energy per round Eencr is much higher for RC5 than for
DES with a factor greater than 8. As both algorithms are
based on the same basic bitwise operations, this difference
can be explained by the implementation and the quality of
the measures. The important point is that table II gives us a
good idea of the order of energy consumption of a symmetric
cryptography algorithm.
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Figure 2. Energy consumption of RC5 with various number of rounds [7]
TABLE III. VALUES OF ECOMP0 AND COMPRESSION RATIO α FOR
VARIOUS COMPRESSION ALGORITHMS
Algorithm Ecomp0 (nJ/bit) α
RLE 1.325 17%
S-LZW 5.6 53%
K-RLE 2.575 56%
B. Modeling compression
Now, we model compression in the same manner as encryp-
tion. We use the results of [9] to model the energy consumption
of compression as:
Ecomp(λ) = λ× Ecomp0 (2)
We assume that the energy consumption for compression
algorithms is only proportional to the length of the input data.
Generally, compression algorithms do not have a setup phase,
they only take decisions according to the input data.
Table III shows the values of Ecomp0 and the compression
ratio α for various algorithms: S-LZW [11], RLE and K-RLE.
S-LZW and RLE are lossless compression algorithms while K-
RLE is a lossly compression algorithm. All measures are taken
from [9] on the same sets of data of length λ = 500 bytes
= 4000 bits.
C. Modeling communication
As we want to compare different scenarios with the simple
scenario of just sending the data, we need a communication
model. We take the communication model from [15]:
Etrans(λ) = λ× (Etrans0 + × d2) (3)
In this model, Etrans0 is the electrical energy and is set to
50nJ/bit,  is the transmit amplifier and is set to 100pJ/m2/bit,
and d is the distance to the receiving node.
V. ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT SCENARIOS WITH
COMPRESSION AND ENCRYPTION
In this section, we examine several scenarios using com-
pression and encryption and the models described in (1), (2)
and (3).
• Scenario T: in this scenario, we only consider the
transmission of λ bits of input data.
• Scenario CT: in this scenario, we consider the com-
pression of λ bits of input data with a compression
ratio of α that is then transmitted.
• Scenario ET: in this scenario, we consider the encryp-
tion of λ bits of input data that is then transmitted.
• Scenario CET: in this scenario, we consider the com-
pression of λ bits of input data with a compression
ratio of α that is then encrypted and transmitted.
There is no need for a fifth scenario with encryption
followed by compression and then by transmission as it would
consume more energy than scenario CET.
Our goal is to show that scenario CET can consume as
much energy as scenario T which would provide energy-free
security.
A. Energy for the different scenarios
The energy consumption for scenario T is given by:
ET(λ) = Etrans(λ)
= λ× (Etrans0 + × d2) (4)
The energy consumption for scenario CT is given by:
ECT(λ) = Ecomp(λ) + Etrans((1− α)× λ)
= λ× (Ecomp0 + (1− α)× (Etrans0 + × d2))
(5)
The energy consumption for scenario ET is given by:
EET(λ, r) = Eenc(λ, r) + Etrans(λ)
= λ× (Eenc0 + r × Eencr + Etrans0 + × d2)
(6)
The energy consumption for scenario CET is given by:
ECET(λ, r) = Ecomp(λ) + Eenc((1− α).λ, r) + Etrans((1− α).λ)
= λ× (Ecomp0 + (1− α)× (Eenc0 + r × Eencr +
Etrans0 + × d2))
(7)
Table IV shows the energy consumptions with λ = 64 bits,
r = 8 rounds and d = 25m in the different scenarios.
λ = 64 bits is a typical size for a physical scalar data
like temperature. r = 8 rounds is rather weak for DES
and RC5. d = 25m is a typical distance in wireless sensor
networks. We observe that, as expected, with any choice of
algorithms, scenario CT consumes less energy than scenario T
that consumes less energy than scenario CET that consumes
less energy than scenario ET.
Table V shows the energy consumptions with λ = 64 bits,
r = 16 rounds and d = 75m in the different scenarios. In
this case, the number of rounds is r = 16, which is the
maximum for DES and which is nearly the recommended
number of rounds for RC5. The distance has been extended to
75m. We note that the energy consumption of scenario CET is
TABLE IV. ENERGY CONSUMPTIONS (IN µJ) WITH λ = 64 BITS,
r = 8 ROUNDS AND d = 25M
Algorithms ET ECT EET ECET
DES + RLE 7.200 6.061 37.132 30.904
DES + S-LZW 7.200 3.742 37.132 17.810
DES + K-RLE 7.200 3.333 37.132 16.503
RC5 + RLE 7.200 6.061 117.449 97.567
RC5 + S-LZW 7.200 3.742 117.449 55.559
RC5 + K-RLE 7.200 3.333 117.449 51.842
TABLE V. ENERGY CONSUMPTIONS (IN µJ) WITH λ = 64 BITS,
r = 16 ROUNDS AND d = 75M
Algorithms ET ECT EET ECET
DES + RLE 39.200 32.621 79.914 66.414
DES + S-LZW 39.200 18.782 79.914 37.918
DES + K-RLE 39.200 17.413 79.914 35.327
RC5 + RLE 39.200 32.621 238.168 197.765
RC5 + S-LZW 39.200 18.782 238.168 112.298
RC5 + K-RLE 39.200 17.413 238.168 104.959
less than the energy consumption of scenario T, with the DES
algorithm combined with S-LZW or K-RLE. In the other case,
the compression algorithm does not have a good enough com-
pression ratio (RLE), or the encryption algorithm consumes
so much that it cannot be counterbalanced by compression
(RC5). These figures, with realistic parameters, show that it
is possible to have energy-free security but we need a more
precise condition.
B. Energy-free security
In this section, we try to precise the previous result, i.e.,
we try to compute the maximum number of rounds rmax for
various values of d and the given compression algorithms. The
following theorem gives the computation of rmax:
Theorem 1: Security is free if and only if:
r ≤ α× (E
trans
0 + × d2)− (1− α)× Eenc0 − Ecomp0
(1− α)× Eencr︸ ︷︷ ︸
=rmax(α,d)
The proof is straightforward, it directly comes from (4) and
(7) with the condition that ECET(λ, r) ≤ ET(λ). We note that
the condition does not depend anymore on the length of the
data which is normal because, in each scenario, the energy is
proportional to the length of the data.
Table VI shows rmax(α, d) for the three compression
algorithms and the DES algorithm, with d varying from 25m
to 100m. We observe that for distance of 25m, security
can not be free whatever the compression algorithm is, i.e.,
rmax(α, d) < 0. The RLE algorithm do not compress enough
and can never provide free security.
The results for S-LZW and K-RLE are quite close. For a
distance of 50m, the maximum number of rounds is 1 and 3
respectively, which provides no security at all as there exists
some easy known attacks on DES. For a distance of 75m, as
already seen, the full DES with 16 rounds can be used for free
with both compression algorithms. For a distance of 100m,
Triple-DES, that has 48 rounds and provides strong security,
can be used for free in the case of K-RLE.
Table VII shows rmax(α, d) for the three compression
algorithms and the RC5 algorithm, with d varying from 25m
TABLE VI. rmax(α, d) WITH THE DES ALGORITHM
Algorithms 25m 50m 75m 100m
RLE – – – –
S-LZW – 1.291 18.024 41.450
K-RLE – 3.645 22.531 48.970
TABLE VII. rmax(α, d) WITH THE RC5 ALGORITHM
Algorithms 25m 50m 75m 100m
RLE – – – –
S-LZW – – 1.976 4.823
K-RLE – 0.228 2.524 5.737
to 100m. RC5 consumes more energy than DES and the results
for RC5 are not very good. Even for a distance of 100m, the
maximum number of rounds is 4 and 5 for S-LZW and K-RLE
respectively, which does not provide any security. The solution
in this case is to optimize the implementation of RC5 or to
find a better compression algorithm.
VI. ANALYSIS WITH A LINEAR NETWORK
In this section, we try to improve the previous results con-
sidering a linear network. Our idea is that the energy consumed
on the sending node can be counterbalanced globally over the
network by the savings of the other nodes, due to the size of
the compressed data. This could improve the security of the
data while still competing with scenario T.
A. Model
We use a linear network of n+1 nodes, the first node that
generates data and n relays in the multi-hop communication to
the base station. Each node only communicates with its closest
neighbors that are at distance d. The last node communicates
with the base station that is at distance d too.
On this linear network, we examine the global energy in
scenario T and scenario CET. In each scenario, the data is
sent by the first node, then received n times and transmitted
n times until the base station.
We still use the communication model from [15] for
receiving:
Erecv(λ) = λ× Erecv0 (8)
Erecv0 is the electrical energy and is set to 50nJ/bit.
The energy consumption for scenario T with a linear
network is given by:
ETnet(λ, n) = E
trans(λ) + n× (Erecv(λ) + E trans(λ))
= λ× (n× Erecv0 + (n+ 1)× (E trans0 + × d2))
(9)
The energy consumption for scenario CET with a linear
network is given by:
ECETnet (λ, r, n) = E
CET(λ, r) + n× (Erecv((1− α).λ) +
Etrans((1− α).λ))
= λ× (Ecomp0 + (1− α)× (Eenc0 + r × Eencr +
n× Erecv0 + (n+ 1)× (Etrans0 + × d2)))
(10)
TABLE VIII. rNETmax(α, 25, n) WITH THE DES ALGORITHM AND A
LINEAR NETWORK
Algorithms n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 10 n = 15
RLE – – – 2.615 10.517
S-LZW – 8.653 34.756 78.262 121.767
K-RLE 2.134 11.955 41.416 90.518 139.620
TABLE IX. rNETmax(α, 25, n) WITH THE RC5 ALGORITHM AND A
LINEAR NETWORK
Algorithms n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 10 n = 15
RLE – – – 0.103 1.064
S-LZW – 0.837 4.010 9.297 14.585
K-RLE 0.045 1.238 4.819 10.787 16.754
Now we can state an extension of theorem 1 for a linear
network and compute rnetmax(α, d, n):
Theorem 2: Security is free in a linear network of n + 1
nodes if and only if:
r ≤ n.α.E
recv
0 + (n+ 1).α.(E
trans
0 + .d
2)− (1− α).Eenc0 − Ecomp0
(1− α)× Eencr︸ ︷︷ ︸
=rnetmax(α,d,n)
B. Results
Table VIII shows rnetmax(α, d, n) for the three compression
algorithms and the DES algorithm, with d = 25m and n
varying from 1 to 15. We observe that with only one-hop
before the base station, security is free with the K-RLE
compression algorithm, even if the number of rounds provides
very weak security. For n ≥ 5, the maximum number of rounds
for S-LZW and K-RLE exceeds the number of round for DES,
and for n ≥ 10, it exceeds the number of rounds for Triple-
DES. This shows that very strong security can be achieved for
free on a wide network.
Table IX shows rnetmax(α, d, n) for the three compression
algorithms and the RC5 algorithm, with d = 25m and n
varying from 1 to 15. In this case, the situation is better
than in the experiment with a single node, but the level of
security is not as strong as the level for DES. For n ≥ 15, the
maximum number of rounds is 14 and 16 for S-LZW and K-
RLE respectively, which a little less than the recommended 18-
20 rounds for good security. Once again, the implementation
of the algorithm must be improved in order to achieve better
results.
VII. ANALYSIS WITH RANDOM NETWORKS
In this section, we compute rmax on random networks. We
focus on DES and K-RLE as it’s the best combination of a
compression algorithm and an encryption algorithm that we
have.
A. Experiment
The difficulty in this experiment is to choose an application
to make the measures. We decided to test a simple routing
application on a square area of width w. The network is
composed of n nodes uniformly distributed on the area. Two
nodes can communicate if their distance is less than 0.4×w so
that there is, on average, half of the nodes in the neighborhood
of each node, whatever the width of the area.
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Figure 3. Distribution of rmax for n =50 nodes and w = 50m
Among the n nodes, 20 nodes are chosen to be sources of
messages of size λ = 64bits. Those messages are routed to
a sink which is placed at the coordinates (0.9 × w, 0.9 × w)
thanks to a shortest path algorithm which takes into account
the square of the distance between each node (as the energy
for transmitting a message is proportional to the square of the
distance). Then, each source sends a message to the sink along
the chosen path.
To compute rmax for a given network, we first compute
the energy ET that is consumed for scenario T. Then, we
compute the energy that is consumed for scenario CET with
r = 0 rounds, which is necessarily less than the ET (sce-
nario CET with r = 0 rounds is similar to scenario CT). Then,
the number of rounds is increased until the energy is more that
ET which means we have reached rmax.
This experiment is repeated on 1000 different random
network for each value of (n,w).
B. Results
Figure 3 shows the distribution of rmax for n =50 nodes
and w = 50m. We observe that this distribution is not
symmetric and is quite wide so that the computation of an
average is not very relevant. That’s why we decided to compute
the first decile of the measures, i.e., the value of rmax that
divide the data set in 10% of low values and 90% of high
values. In this case, the first decile is 45 which means that for
a random network with our simple routing application, taking
DES with 45 rounds (nearly Triple DES) and K-RLE is energy-
free with a probability of 0.9.
This result is not a surprise as it can be compared to the
results of table VIII. The range of the network is a little shorter
in the case of random networks (20m), but the average number
of hops from the sources to the sink must be high enough
so that the energy for encryption is counterbalanced by the
savings along the paths.
Table X shows the computation of the first decile for
many values of (n,w). This table shows that in any case, it
is possible to have strong energy-free security on a random
network. We observe that, for a fixed w, rmax increases sub-
linearly w.r.t. n. Adding more nodes on the area make paths
shorter, but not short enough so that the gain in energy can
bring many more rounds. We also observe that for a fixed n,
rmax increases over-linearly w.r.t. w. In this case, the distances
TABLE X. FIRST DECILE OF rmax FOR A NETWORK OF n NODES ON A
SQUARE AREA OF WIDTH w
n
w 50m 100m 200m 300m 400m
50 45 52 72 102 141
100 76 84 97 119 148
150 98 108 121 138 163
200 101 125 137 152 173
between nodes is increased and the gain in energy can be used
to do many more rounds.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We show that it is possible to provide strong and free
security thanks to a careful choice of compression algorithm
and cryptographic algorithm. We provide models for the en-
ergy consumption of compression algorithms and encryption
algorithms. Our models are derived from experiments done
by ourselves or found in the literature, with a MSP430-based
node.
It would be interesting to implement these algorithms
on real nodes and check that security is really free. The
consumption of the transmission comes from a model that is
not derived from real experiments so an extension of this work
could be to verify this model with various radio chips.
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